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INTRODUCTION
Todd Brinkmeyer (Brinkmeyer) asks the Court to reverse the trial court's holdings that he
tortiously interfered with and conspired to breach a contract. The contract in question is a
purchase and sale agreement between Tricore Investments, LLC (Tricore) and the Estate of
Francis Elaine Warren (the Warren Estate) for property the estate owned along Priest Lake (the
Tricore PSA). The Warren Estate later agreed to sell the same property to John Stockton
(Stockton) and Brinkmeyer (the Stockton PSA), pursuant to a right of first refusal Bill and Elaine
Warren granted Stockton. That led Tri core to sue the Warren Estate, Stockton, and Brinkmeyer.
The trial court's conclusions that Stockton and Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the
Tri core PSA and conspired with the Warren Estate to breach it cannot be sustained. The trial
court's own findings of fact establish that the Warrens granted Stockton a right of first refusal on
their Priest Lake property. And the record supports that finding. While not in writing, the Warren
Estate and Stockton acknowledged the right of first refusal and told Brinkmeyer it was valid,
enforceable, and superior to all other prospective purchasers. The Warren Estate and Stockton
also fully performed under the right of first refusal.
Despite that, the trial court held that Stockton's right of first refusal was unenforceable as
a matter oflaw under Idaho's deadman's statute. It also found it "ludicrous" for Brinkmeyer to
believe that Stockton held a legitimate right of first refusal. Tricore would like the Court to
believe that Brinkmeyer's appeal simply challenges the trial court's findings of fact, but that is
not the case. The trial court failed to properly apply Idaho law on rights of first refusal, the
deadman's statute, the statute of frauds, tortious interference, and conspiracy. It also erred in

1
107097585.7 0076747-00001

awarding Tricore attorney fees against Brinkmeyer and in setting a bond amount that purports to
compensate Tricore for the "lost opportunity" to develop the property.
In addition to those issues, Tricore cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that it was not
entitled to money damages. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Tricore
failed to prove its alleged damages with reasonable certainty. Tricore sought "loss of use"
damages for being deprived the use of the Warren Estate's property, which it tried to calculate
from increased development costs and property value. But its own witnesses testified that its
proposed development of the property was speculative and its cost estimates mere guesstimates.
The trial court did not err in finding that Tricore's alleged damages were "pulled out of thin air."
The judgment against Brinkmeyer must be reversed, and the ruling that Tricore is not
entitled to damages must be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tricore's factual background requires correction on a number of points. For example,
Tricore asserts that "Appellants fail to address or discuss the Trial Court's Findings of Fact."
Tricore Br. 3. That is not true. The trial court's findings of fact are located at R. 1994-2005. 1
Brinkmeyer supported his statement of facts with citations to the trial court's factual findings and
the trial evidence and also pointed out findings that have no evidentiary support in the record.

See Brinkmeyer Br. 2-20. It is Tricore's factual background that contains argument and

1

Brinkmeyer uses the same citation format used in his opening brief. The clerk's record
is cited as "R." The trial exhibits are cited as "Ex.," followed by the "COE" page cite. The
Reporter's Transcript is cited as "Tr.," followed by the witness' name. Transcripts from motion
hearings are cited as "Tr." with the hearing date. The parties' opening briefs are cited as "Br."
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overstatements and presents a biased interpretation of the record. See Tricore Br. 3-7.
1.

There was admissible evidence of Stockton's right of first refusal. Tricore asserts

there was no admissible evidence of Stockton's right of first refusal at trial. Tri core Br. 4. But
while Tricore objected to, and the trial court excluded, testimony regarding Bill's statements on
the right of first refusal, there was other admissible evidence supporting the Warrens' oral
agreement with Stockton. In particular, Tricore did not object, and in fact stipulated, to the
admission of the Indemnification Agreement. See Tr. 402:6-403:21 (Oct. 29, 2018).
In that agreement, the Warren Estate and Stockton mutually acknowledged that Stockton
"owns a right of first refusal to purchase" the Priest Lake property, that Stockton acquired the
right "for valuable consideration," and that Stockton's right was "valid and enforceable" and
"superior to that of ... all other prospective purchasers." Ex. 8 (COE 106); R. 2003. There was
other evidence admitted as well. See, e.g., Tr. 568:2-572:1 (Stockton); Tr. 663:25-668:5, 705:16707:22 (Brinkmeyer). To be sure, the trial court found that "Bill and Elaine Warren promised to
give Stockton the first right to purchase any additional Priest Lake property they offered for
sale."2 R. 1995.
2.

The Warren Estate did not offer "the property" to Stockton and Brinkmeyer

before September 2, 2016. Tricore repeatedly asserts that the Warren Estate offered to sell "the
property" to Stockton and Brinkmeyer, but they choose not to buy it. See Tricore Br. 3, 4-5, 910, 32. The trial court also found the Warren Estate gave Stockton "the opportunity to buy the
2

While the trial court referred to Stockton's right as a "first right to purchase,"
Brinkmeyer presumes the court meant to write "first right of refusal." There was no evidence
presented that the Warrens granted Stockton any other legal right.
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property before it was ever listed." R. 2015. Neither assertion is supported by the record.
What Tricore and the trial court refer to as "the property" is the property subject to the
Tri core PSA - approximately 65 acres of wetland property along Priest Lake, consisting of
Parcel A (~23 acres), minus one or two parcels of"not less than 200 feet of waterfront," and
Parcels Band C (~45 acres). R. 1997; Ex. 213 (COE 342-44). Recall that when the Warren
Estate first listed Parcel B for sale in August 2015, see Ex. 201 (COE 53), the whole of the Priest
Lake property was configured as Parcels A, B, and C, Ex. 249 (COE 441). By the time the
Warren Estate began negotiations with Tricore in the fall of 2015, the property had been
resurveyed. Ex. 36 (COE 67). Parcel A remained the same, but Parcel B was replatted as Parcels
B and C, and Parcel C was replatted as Parcels D and E.
The Warren Estate did not offer "the property" to Stockton and Brinkmeyer before they
agreed to purchase it on September 2, 2016. In particular, the Warren Estate never offered them
Parcel A. That was true in May 2014, when John Finney (Finney), the Warren Estate's attorney,
offered Stockton what was then Parcel B, along with Elaine's house parcel. Ex. 11 (COE 11215); Tr. 788:9-789: 12, 790: 10-25 (Finney); see also Tr. 552:3-15 (Stockton). It was also true
before August 2015, when the Warren Estate listed Parcel B for sale. Ex. 13 (COE 118); Ex. 14
(COE 119); Ex. 201 (COE 53-58); Tr. 716: 10-21, 789: 18-790:25 (Finney); Tr. 553: 17-554:7
(Stockton); Tr. 617:18-618:1 (Brinkmeyer).
Later that fall, the Warren Estate agreed to sell Tricore newly designated Parcels B and C
for $2 million. R. 1996-97; Ex. 204 (COE 284-96). That deal fell through and in the next phase
of negotiations, the Warren Estate and Tricore entered into the Tricore PSA, adding Parcel A,
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minus one or two parcels of "not less than 200 feet of waterfront," and agreeing to a price of $2 .4
million. R. 1997; Ex. 213 (COE 329-45). Based on the undisputed trial record, the Warren Estate
did not offer "the property" to Stockton or Brinkmeyer on those or any other terms before
September 2, 2016. See Ex. 8 (COE 106) ("Sellers failed to afford Mr. Stockton an opportunity
to purchase the Property on the terms proposed" by the Tricore PSA); Tr. 790:10-25 (Finney);
Tr. 553:1-4, 574:25-575:19 (Stockton); Tr. 651:22-652:13 (Brinkmeyer).
3.

Dan Warren did not testify that the Warren Estate knew on September 2, 2016,

that Tricore would eventually close on the Tri core PSA. According to Tricore, Dan Warren
(Dan) testified that the Warren Estate knew at the September 2, 2016 meeting with Stockton and
Brinkmeyer that Tricore was going to close on the Tricore PSA. Tricore Br. 12, 18, 22, 30, 33
(citing Tr. 89-92 (Dan)). Tricore then cites Dan's testimony expansively, contending it supports,
among other things, that Stockton and Brinkmeyer knew Tricore would close the Tricore PSA,

id. at 1, 22; that the legal description of the property in the Tri core PSA satisfied the statute of
frauds, id. at 12; that "Stockton's lawyers" "invented" the Warren Estate's repudiation defense,

id. at 22; that Tricore had a valid business expectancy in the property, id. at 30; and that Stockton
and Brinkmeyer's actions to enter into the Stockton PSA were improper, id. at 33.
Setting aside the relevance of those arguments, Tricore misstates Dan's testimony.
Tricore relies entirely on Dan's response to this deposition question: "After you sold the property

to Brinkmeyer ... did your brother tell you that Tricore was saying they would still go through
with the deal, that they wanted to close on their contract?" Tr. 90:8-14 (Dan) (emphasis added).
Dan responded that "[it] had been talked about," but he was not sure if it was during "a closed
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door meeting or whatever." Tr. 90:16-18 (Dan). Still referring to the time after the property was
sold, Tricore's counsel followed with: "And I asked you, Question: 'That they were willing to go
through with the sale?"' Tr. 90:19-20 (Dan). Dan's answer was "As, far as we knew, that the
whole thing was going to go eventually." Tr. 90:23-24 (Dan).
Tricore omits that the entire exchange was premised on whether Dan learned, "[a]fter

you sold the property to Brinkmeyer," that Tricore was willing to go through with the Tricore
PSA. See also R. 1170. Dan's testimony cannot be stretched to mean that, somehow, the legal
description of the Priest Lake property was sufficient, that Stockton's lawyers invented the
Warren Estate's trial defenses, that Tricore had a valid business expectancy, and that Stockton
and Brinkmeyer used improper means to interfere with the Tricore PSA.
4.

Stockton and Brinkmeyer did not direct the Warren Estate to repudiate the Tricore

PSA and to deceive Tricore. Tricore also asserts, as fact, that Stockton and Brinkmeyer
orchestrated the Warren Estate's conduct, actions, and decisions. As told by Tricore, Stockton,
Brinkmeyer, and/or Stockton's lawyers "direct[ed]" the Warren Estate to repudiate the Tricore
PSA and to deceive Tricore regarding their purchase of the Priest Lake property. See Tricore Br.
3, 7, 29, 33, 34. There is no record evidence to support those assertions. When Tricore does offer
a record cite, it cites to the Indemnification Agreement (Ex. 8 (COE 106)) or two emails
Stockton's attorneys sent to Finney on September 6, 2016 (Ex. 5 (COE 797); Ex. 6 (COE 793)).
But neither the Indemnification Agreement nor the emails support that Stockton and
Brinkmeyer directed the Warren Estate to take any action. Nowhere does the Indemnification
Agreement state, or even imply, that Stockton and Brinkmeyer directed the Warren Estate to
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repudiate the Tricore PSA. It only states, after recognizing that Stockton "owns a right of first
refusal to purchase the Property," that the Warren Estate "agreed to repudiate their obligations
under the Warren-Tricore PSA." Ex. 8 (COE 106); see also Tr. 747:4-16 (Finney).
Nor was there any evidence that Stockton and Brinkmeyer directed the Warren Estate to
purportedly deceive Tricore regarding their purchase of the Priest Lake property. See Tricore Br.
3, 29. The two emails concern Finney's email to Chuck Lempsis, Tricore's attorney. One states:
"John, looks fine to me. Only question is should we delete the last paragraph re reimbursement
of some of their costs and just wait for them to request reimbursement. I would prefer just taking
that paragraph out and see what they do." Ex. 5 (COE 797). The other states: "One[] other point,
maybe send to Chuck after we close this afternoon." Ex. 6 (COE 793).
Tricore again overstates the evidence. It does not explain how asking "should we delete
the last paragraph re reimbursement" or suggesting that "maybe send [an email] to Chuck after
we close" amounts to directing the Warren Estate's alleged deceit or is, in any way, improper
conduct. No evidence was introduced at trial that Stockton or Brinkmeyer exerted any control
over the Warren Estate or directed the Warren Estate's decisions or actions.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
Brinkmeyer lists the issues he presents on appeal (Nos. 1-4) at pages 22-23 of his opening
brief. In addition, Brinkmeyer restates the issues Tricore raises on cross-appeal as:
5.

Did the trial court correctly find Tricore was not entitled to money damages when

it failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty and was awarded specific performance?
6.

Did the trial court correctly refuse to award damages against Brinkmeyer under
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the Idaho Consumer Protection Act when the court found he was not liable under the statute?
7.

Is Tri core entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal when Brinkmeyer makes

good-faith arguments on appeal?

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred in finding Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the Tricore
PSA.
Tricore likens this appeal to one that second-guesses the trial court's findings of fact.

That is not so. While Brinkmeyer challenges some factual findings that are not supported by the
record, the thrust of this appeal is the trial court's failure to properly apply Idaho law on rights of
first refusal, the statute of frauds, and tortious interference with contract. See Brinkmeyer Br. 2438. Whether the trial court correctly stated and applied the governing law and whether the legal
conclusions are sustained by the facts found are questions of law for the Court. Pocatello Hosp.,

LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv 'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714, 330 P.3d 1067, 1072 (2014).

A.

Brinkmeyer did not tortiously interfere with the Tricore PSA because the
contract is unenforceable and Tricore cannot recover damages for its breach.
1.

Tricore cannot maintain a tortious interference claim against
Brinkmeyer if the Warren Estate establishes the Tricore PSA is void.

According to Tricore, Brinkmeyer failed to address the substantial evidence that shows
the Tricore PSA is an enforceable contract. Tricore Br. 29. Brinkmeyer, however, simply states
what is obvious: Tricore cannot prevail on its tortious interference with contract claim unless a
contract exists. To establish the claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract,
(2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract, (3) intentional interference causing breach of the
contract, and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co.,
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95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974).
The first element is not satisfied unless a contract exists that would entitle Tricore to
recover damages for the contract's breach. See Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't ofAdmin.,
155 Idaho 55, 64,305 P.3d 499,508 (2013) (addressing the first requirement ofa tortious
interference claim). The Warren Estate argues the Tricore PSA is not enforceable and is void
because there was no meeting of the minds and/or Tricore repudiated the contract. See Warren
Estate Br.§ IV.C and D; Warren Estate Reply Br.§ LC and D. If the Warren Estate prevails on
its arguments, Tricore' s interference claim against Brinkmeyer must necessarily fail. See Syringa
Networks, 155 Idaho at 64, 305 P.3d at 508.

2.

Tricore cannot maintain a tortious interference claim against
Brinkmeyer if the Warren Estate establishes that the Tricore PSA is
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

There is another reason why the Tricore PSA is not enforceable and cannot be the basis
of a tortious interference claim against Brinkmeyer - it is voidable, in this action, by the Warren
Estate under the statute of frauds, Idaho Code§ 9-505. As an affirmative defense to Tricore's
claims, the Warren Estate contends the Tricore PSA is unenforceable because the property
description fails to designate "exactly" the property to be sold. See Warren Estate Br. § IV.B;
Warren Estate Reply Br. §LB.If that is so, the Tricore PSA would be voidable at the Warren
Estate's election. See Silicon Int'! Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538,551,314 P.3d 593,
606 (2013); Bevercombe v. Denney & Co., 40 Idaho 34, 39,231 P. 427,428 (1924).
And if Tri core is unable to enforce the Tri core PSA against the Warren Estate here, in
this case, no enforceable contract will exist, no breach will have occurred, and no injury will
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have been suffered. Tricore' s tortious interference claim must necessarily fail. See Syringa

Networks, 155 Idaho at 64, 305 P.3d at 508. In response, Tricore contends the description of the
property in the Tricore PSA is sufficient to identify the property and that the Warren Estate
fabricated its statute of frauds argument. Tricore Br. 12-18. While the Warren Estate's reply brief
addresses those issues, Brinkmeyer offers the following observations.
First, Idaho law does not support Tricore's argument that the description of the Priest
Lake property in the Tricore PSA is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds simply because
there was intent to sell and buy the property. The property description reserving a portion of
Parcel A to the Warren Estate - "The Sellers reserve and retain from Parcel A and Buyer shall
create in compliance with Bonner County Planning and Zoning provisions and approval, a
parcel(s) in size not less than 200 feet of waterfront ... adjacent to Tax 31 between the existing
access road and the lake" - is plainly inadequate. See Ex. 213 (COE 344 at ,-r 5). That description
is riddled with deficiencies.
The quantity, identity, or boundaries of the Warren Estate's reservation cannot be
determined from the face of the contract or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which the
contract refers. See Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 281-82, 92
P .3d 526, 531-32 (2004 ). The description of the reservation merely identifies a particular plot of
land that will be created at a later date without providing a single boundary line or the quantity of
the reserved property. That was precisely the scenario presented in Lexington Heights, where the
seller reserved from a larger parcel "no more than five (5) acres immediately surrounding the
proposed residential development[,] ... the precise size, location, dimensions and configuration
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of which shall be mutually determined by Seller and Buyer." Id. at 278, 92 P.3d at 528.
As in Lexington Heights, the issue here is not whether the parties had reached an
agreement; it is whether the parties' written agreement contains an adequate description of the
property to be sold. Id. at 282-83, 92 P.3d at 532-33. The Tricore PSA violates the statute of
frauds because the quantity, identity, and boundaries of the property cannot be determined from
the face of the instrument, regardless of whether the parties could have agreed upon the
boundaries at a later date. See id. at 283, 92 P.3d at 533. The description constitutes no more than
an agreement to agree. See also Hilbert v. Hough, 132 Idaho 203,206, 969 P.2d 836, 839 (Ct.
App. 1998) (agreement to decide on "exact boundaries" after having survey performed violated
statute of frauds as it constituted a mere agreement to make an agreement).
Second, Tricore's attempts to distinguish Lexington Heights also fail. Tricore argues the
Tricore PSA was a "hybrid development agreement" and that it "separated the property transfer
provision from the obligation to develop and provide of a lot." Tricore Br. 15. But the
reservation plainly states that "[t]he Sellers reserve and retain from Parcel A" a parcel or parcels
of"not less than 200 feet of waterfront." See Ex. 213 (COE 344 at ,r 5) (emphasis added).
Nothing in that language separates the property to be sold from the property to be developed and
somehow satisfies the statute of frauds.
Tri core's reliance on two federal bankruptcy cases is also misplaced. The buyers in both
cases agreed on the total amount of land to be purchased and described the perimeter of the
property with exactness. In re Ricks, 433 B.R. 806, 820-21 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010); In re Old

Cutters, Inc., 488 B.R. 130, 142 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012). The only uncertainty was where
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individual lot lines would be drawn within the perimeter after the land was developed. Ricks, 433
B.R. at 820-21; Old Cutters, 488 B.R. at 142. As a result, the statute of frauds was not
implicated; the precise amount of acreage to be conveyed was fully defined by the legal
descriptions. Ricks, 433 B.R. at 820-21; Old Cutters, 488 B.R. at 141-42.
Here, unlike the descriptions in Ricks and Old Cutters, the Tricore PSA fails to identify
the boundaries of the property to be sold and retained. The reservation required negotiation to
obtain its precise location. This core deficiency renders Ricks and Old Cutters distinguishable,
whereas Lexington Heights and subsequent Idaho decisions remain precisely on point. See

Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 217-18, 159 P.3d 851, 855 (2007) (finding contract for sale of
114 acres could not be specifically performed because there was no reasonably clear property
description of a retained five-acre parcel); Bauchman-Kingston P 'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, 149
Idaho 87, 91-92, 233 P.3d 18, 22-23 (2008) (finding property description for retained residence
and 4.9 acres did not allow court to pinpoint exactly what acreage was to be transferred).
Third, Tricore does not attempt to defend the trial court's reliance on "Bonner County
Planning and Zoning provisions and the configuration of the [Tri core] development" to ascertain
the location of the carveout. See R. 1257-58. The trial court claimed this "evidence" could be
considered to identify the land described and apply the description to the property. R. 1257. But
while extrinsic evidence may be used "for the purpose of identifying the description contained in
the writing with its location upon the ground," it may not be used "for the purpose of identifying
the land described [about which the parties negotiated] ... and adding to a description insufficient
and void on its face."' Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 281, 92 P.3d at 531 (first quoting Craig
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v. Zelian, 137 Cal. 105, 69 P. 853 (Cal. 1902), then quoting Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 144,
100 P. 1052, 1056 (1909)).
Fourth, that the Stockton PSA contains a similar reservation from Parcel A does not
somehow cure the failure of the Tricore PSA to satisfy the statute of frauds. Unlike the Tri core
PSA, the parties to the Stockton PSA mutually accepted it and performed. See Silicon, 155 Idaho
at 551,314 P.3d at 606 (recognizing that under the statute of frauds an agreement not void but
voidable). Stockton and Brinkmeyer and the Warren Estate subsequently obtained a survey,
supplied a precise legal description, and recorded it with Bonner County. Ex. 81 (COE 961-65).
Conversely, the parties did not perform under the Tricore PSA, nor did they obtain a survey to
supply a precise legal description. Thus, the Stockton PSA has no bearing on the enforceability
of the imprecise legal description in the Tri core PSA.

B.

Brinkmeyer did not tortiously interfere with the Tricore PSA because
Stockton owned a valid right of first refusal and Brinkmeyer had a goodfaith belief in its validity.
1.

The Warren Estate did not offer "the property" to Stockton and did
not give Stockton the chance to meet the terms of the Tricore PSA
until September 2, 2016.

As explained above (supra, at pp. 3-5), the record does not support Tricore's repeated
claims that the Warren Estate previously offered "the property" to Stockton or Brinkmeyer. In
any event, Tricore does not support or explain what legal import such an offer would have on
Stockton's right of first refusal. See Tricore Br. 9-10, 32. Perhaps that is because it has none.
Even if the Warren Estate offered the property to Stockton before September 2, 2016 - or gave
Stockton "the opportunity to buy the property," as the trial court wrongfully found, R. 2015 -
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simply giving Stockton the option to buy the property would not satisfy a right of first refusal.
And again, Tricore provides no argument and cites to no legal authority otherwise.
"A right of first refusal is ' [a] potential buyer's contractual right to meet the terms of a
third party's offer if the seller intends to accept that offer."' Nicholson v. Coeur D'Alene Placer

Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 881, 392 P.3d 1218, 1222 (2017) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
1325 (7th ed. 1999)). Black's Law Dictionary provides this example: "if Beth has a right of first
refusal on the purchase of Sam's house, and if Terry offers to buy the house for $300,000, then
Beth can match this offer and prevent Terry from buying it." Black's Law Dictionary 1325. In
other words, a holder of a right of first refusal "cannot be called upon to exercise or lose that
right unless the entire offer is communicated to him in such a form as to enable him to evaluate it
and make a decision." Gyurkey v. Babier, 103 Idaho 663,666,651 P.2d 928,931 (1982).

Nicholson illustrates that rule. There the trial court held a property owner, who allegedly
granted a right of first refusal did not breach that promise to the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs
made an offer to purchase the property. 161 Idaho at 881, 392 P.3d at 1222. The Court found that
was error, explaining that an option to purchase is different from a right of first refusal. Id. The
property owner did not give the plaintiffs an opportunity to purchase the real property under the
same terms as the third party who purchased the property. Id. Like those plaintiffs, Stockton was
not given the opportunity to purchase the Parcel A (minus the Warren Estate's reservation) and
Parcels B and C under the same terms as the Tricore PSA until September 2, 2016. See Ex. 8
(COE 106); Tr. 790:10-25 (Finney); Tr. 553:1-4, 574:25-575:19 (Stockton).
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2.

The trial court erred in finding Stockton's right of first refusal was
unenforceable as a matter of law.

Brinkmeyer explained in his opening brief (at pp. 27-30) that the trial court, in granting
Tricore's motion in limine, erred in holding Stockton's right of first refusal was unenforceable as
a matter oflaw under the deadman's statute, Idaho Code§ 9-202(3), and Idaho R. Evid. 601(b).

See R. 1318; Tr. 21:5-23:17 (Oct. 26, 2018). For the most part, except for its reliance on the
statute of frauds, Tricore does not try to justify that ruling. Tricore Br. 9-12. Rather it maintains
the deadman's statute prohibits testimony regarding Stockton's right of first refusal, Tricore was
a bona fide purchaser, and testimony regarding the right of first refusal was inadmissible hearsay.

Id. None of those reasons support the trial court's conclusion that Stockton's right of first refusal
is legally unenforceable and that Brinkmeyer tortious interfered with the Tricore PSA.

a.

The deadman's statute does not render Stockton's right of first
refusal legally unenforceable.

The deadman' s statute has no application here, and even if it did, as a rule of evidence, it
cannot render Stockton's right of first refusal legally unenforceable when both the giver and the
holder of the right acknowledge its validity and fully performed. Brinkmeyer Br. 27-29. It is
telling that Tricore does not defend, with argument or authority, the trial court's reliance on the
deadman's statute to find the right of first refusal was legally unenforceable or to exclude
statements regarding Stockton's right of first refusal. See Tricore Br. 10.
Tricore does not address that the deadman's statute is a rule barring testimony introduced

against an estate, not by it. See Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 699, 963 P .2d 372,
382 (1998). Nor does Tricore address that the statute may only be asserted by the Warren Estate,
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see Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477,482, 511 P.2d 294,299 (1973), and that the Warren Estate
acknowledged Stockton's right of first refusal, Tr. 23:18-25:17 (Oct. 26, 2018) (offer of proof);
Ex. 8 (COE 106). Instead, Tricore seems to argue that the trial court's error was somehow
harmless, because it allowed testimony regarding Stockton's right of the first refusal as
"potentially relevant" to the issue of whether Stockton and Brinkmeyer' s interference with the
Tri core PSA was intentional. See R. 1318.
But the trial court's rulings were far from harmless. The trial court held that "[a]s a
matter, to-wit: the Deadman's Statute, LC.§ 9-202(3) and I.R.E. 601(b), there is no legally
enforceable right of first refusal." R. 1318; see also Tr. 21:10 ("There is no valid right of first
refusal."), 21:22-25 ("[W]e're not going to talk about having the right of first refusal having been
executed. There was no legally enforceable right of first refusal."), 22:20-22 ("I just want it to be
clear that as a matter of law there is no - there was right of first refusal that could have ever been
asserted."), 23: 1-4 ("[I]t' s just unimaginable that they would say there is a valid right of first
refusal when you have a situation where both of the Warrens are deceased.") (Oct. 26, 2018).
The trial court placed great weight on that ruling. From there, it refused to consider
whether Stockton and Brinkmeyer were pursuing a legal right, or had a good-faith belief in a
legal right, to purchase the Priest Lake property. R. 2015-17. The trial court inferred that
Stockton and Brinkmeyer' s conduct was substantially certain to interfere with the Tri core PSA.
R. 2015-16. And it found Stockton and Brinkmeyer's belief in the legitimacy of Stockton's right
of first refusal was "ludicrous" and that "[ a]ny competent attorney" should have informed them
that the right was invalid. R. 201 7. Having based those conclusions on the deadman' s statute, the
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trial court abused its discretion and reached conclusions that are not supported by Idaho law. See
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,863,421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018); Pocatello Hosp., 156

Idaho at 714, 330 P.3d at 1072.

b.

The statute of frauds does not render Stockton's right of first
refusal legally unenforceable.

Turning to the statute of frauds, Tricore relies on Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187,
190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981) and Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 883, 392 P.3d at 1224, for the rule
that failure to comply with the statute renders an oral agreement for real estate unenforceable.
Tricore Br. 10-11. But like the trial court, Tricore fails to recognize that an oral agreement failing
under the statute of frauds is voidable, not void. See Silicon, 155 Idaho at 551,314 P.3d at 606.
The statute of frauds does not prevent an oral contract if the parties mutually accept and fully
perform it. Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-09, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-72 (Ct. App. 1986).
That is what distinguishes Hoffman and Nicholson from this case. In Hoffman, a party to
the oral real estate agreement successfully challenged its enforceability under the statute of
frauds. 102 Idaho at 188, 190, 628 P.2d at 219, 221. In Nicholson, the property owner claimed
the alleged oral right of first refusal was unenforceable. 161 Idaho at 881, 392 P.3d at 1222.
Relying in part on Lexington Heights, the Court ultimately found the property description too
vague to be specifically enforced by the parties. Id. at 882-83, 392 P.3d at 1223-24. Here, in
contrast, the Warren Estate and Stockton mutually acknowledged Stockton's right of first refusal
to the Priest Lake property and fully performed. Ex. 8 (COE 6); Ex. 2 (COE 92-99).
Tricore does not address the fact that the Warren Estate and Stockton both accepted the
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agreement and performed. Tricore Br. 10-11. Nor does it explain why, if the statute of frauds is
an affirmative defense between the parties to the agreement, see Bevercombe, 40 Idaho at 39-40,
231 P. at 428-29, it can challenge the validity of the right of first refusal and somehow render the
agreement unenforceable. It cannot. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 144, W estlaw ( 1981,
database updated June 2020) ("Only a party to a contract ... can assert that the contract is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds."). Moreover, having convinced the trial court to
exclude testimony regarding Stockton's right of first refusal, Tricore cannot legitimately argue
that the Warren Estate and Stockton failed to adequately describe the property.

c.

Tricore's alleged status as a good-faith purchaser does not
render Stockton's right of first refusal legally unenforceable.

Tri core also contends that "Appellants' arguments fail because Tricore is a bona fide
good-faith purchaser for value," but it does not identify what arguments or which appellant.
Tricore Br. 11. To the extent Tricore argues that its alleged status as a good-faith purchaser
somehow renders Stockton's right of first refusal unenforceable between he and the Warren
Estate, Tricore cites no legal authority. See id. Moreover, Tricore did not assert such an argument
before the trial court. See R. 1727-48, 1881-1930. Issues not raised below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221-22, 443 P.3d 231, 235-36 (2019).
Even so, Tri core is not a good-faith purchaser of the Warren Estate's Priest Lake
property. "The doctrine of good faith purchaser for value is available to protect title obtained, not
to acquire title." Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 142, 59 P.3d 308, 313 (2002). Thus Tricore must
have acquired title to the property, which it never did. See id. (finding plaintiff was not a good-
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faith purchaser under Idaho Code§ 45-1506 because he did not acquire title); The David &
Marvel Benton Tr. v. McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 150-51, 384 P.3d 392, 397-98 (2016) (finding

Idaho Code § 55-606 is a recording statute and is not applicable absent a grant or conveyance).
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "buyers do not qualify for relief as bona fide
purchasers. By the weight of authority, a bona fide purchaser must have obtained a legal title to
the property in question." Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983).
Yet, Tricore claims that it is a good-faith purchaser because the Tricore PSA was an
executory contract. Tricore cites Fulton v. Dura, 107 Idaho 240, 687 P.2d 1367 (Ct. App. 1984),
ajf'd, 108 Idaho 392, 700 P.2d 14 (1985), for that proposition, but there are critical distinctions

between the facts in that case and those here. In particular, Fulton considered whether an
executory contract created a property interest within the meaning of Idaho Code § 10-1110,
which addresses judgment liens. Id. at 245, 687 P.2d at 1372. Further Fulton specifically limited
its holding to executory contracts that have been recorded. Id. Fulton does not make Tricore a
good-faith purchaser, nor does it invalidate Stockton's right of first refusal.

d.

Even if Bill's statements on Stockton's right of first refusal are
hearsay, other admissible evidence confirmed the creation and
validity of the right.

Tri core also contends the trial court properly excluded the statements of Bill regarding
Stockton's right of first refusal as hearsay. Tricore Br. 11-12. But as before, Tricore does not
explain how, or cite any authority that, the exclusion of such statements invalidates the right of
first refusal or renders it legally enforceable. See id. Even if those statements were hearsay, there
was other admissible evidence supporting the right of first refusal. Brinkmeyer pointed to that
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evidence above (supra, at p. 3).
Moreover, the trial court itself found that found that Stockton was granted a right of first
refusal by the Warrens:
In 1989, Stockton was negotiating to purchase lakefront from the
Warrens, adjacent to the Brinkmeyers' property. During the
negotiations, Stockton agreed to move his property line to the east to
allow the Warrens to sell additional lakefront property to the
Brinkmeyers. In exchange for this concession, Bill and Elaine Warren
promised to give Stockton the right of first refusal to purchase any
additional Priest Lake property they offered for sale .... Both Dan and
Chris were aware of their parent's promise to Stockton.
R. 1994-95. None of the findings were based on conversations with Bill, as there was other
evidence to sustain them. And none of them have been challenged on appeal and thus are
necessarily binding. See Lockridge v. Amalgamated Ass 'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps.
ofAm., 93 Idaho 294, 304, 460 P.2d 719, 729 (1969) (explaining findings of fact to which the

appellant assigned no error on appeal were necessarily binding on the Court), rev 'don other
grounds, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).

Thus the trial court's exclusion of statements made by Bill does not exclude evidence that
is otherwise admissible and does not invalidate Stockton's right of first refusal or render it
legally enforceable. The record fully supports the creation of Stockton's right of first refusal, and
Idaho law confirms its enforceability.
e.

As a matter of law, Tricore cannot establish tortious
interference if Stockton owns a valid right of first refusal.

Tri core does not address Brinkmeyer' s argument that he cannot be liable for tortious
interference with the Tricore PSA if Stockton owns a right of first refusal. See Tricore Br. 29-33.

20
107097585.7 0076747-00001

The question of whether one has exercised his own legal right is a question of law. See Ludowese

v. Redmann, 479 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("We conclude Burgstahler's
interference with the Morgan-Ludowese contract was justified as a matter of law. In this case it
was the lawful operation of the Redmanns' statutory right of first refusal which prevented the
contract's performance."). Here, the Warren Estate did not give Stockton the right to meet the
terms of Tricore's offer until September 2, 2016. Should the Court conclude that Stockton had a
legal right to interfere, then neither he nor Brinkmeyer could intentionally or wrongfully interfere
to cause a breach of the Tricore PSA. See Crivelli v. Gen. Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386, 395 (3d
Cir. 2000); Sines v. Maddox, 122 Wash. App. 1023, 2004 WL 1528236, at *2 (2004)
(unpublished).

3.

The trial court misapplied the law of interference to find that
Brinkmeyer intentionally and improperly interfered with the Tricore
PSA without justification.

In his opening brief (at pp. 32-35), Brinkmeyer explained that the trial court failed to
property apply the law on tortious interference when it found that Brinkmeyer intentionally and
improperly interfered with the Tricore PSA and that his alleged interference was not justified. So
even if Stockton's right of first refusal does not require the dismissal of Tri core's tortious
interference claim as a matter of law, the trial court's judgment must still be reversed.

a.

The trial court used the wrong legal standard to find "requisite
improper intent" by Brinkmeyer.

"For liability to arise from interference with another's performance of a contract, that
interference must be improper." Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1027, 772 P.2d 228, 234
(Ct. App. 1988); see also BECO Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 723-24, 184
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P.3d 844, 848-49 (2008); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 766, Westlaw (1979, database
updated June 2020). The trial court, however, conflated the intent of the intentional interference
requirement with the requirement that the interference be improper. Despite recognizing that
Tricore must establish improper interference, the trial court conducted no separate analysis on
whether Stockton and Brinkmeyer's actions were improper. R. 2012-17. The trial court only
considered whether intent could be inferred from their conduct. R. 2015-16.
Tellingly, the trial court relied on passages from Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker,
133 Idaho 330,340,986 P.2d 996, 1006 (1999), and Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251,259, 178
P.3d 616, 624 (2008), to infer that Brinkmeyer had the "requisite improper intent." R. 2014,
2015-16. Tricore does not address or respond to that error. Rather, it also confuses inferring
intent with establishing improper interference. See Tricore Br. 31. But it is obvious that the
passages from Highland Enterprises and Bybee do not address improper interference but the
ability of the fact-finder to infer intent from conduct that is substantially certain to interfere with
the contract. See R. 2015.
The question of whether the actor's interference is improper is different. As Tricore
acknowledges, for Brinkmeyer's conduct to have been improper, he must have had an improper
motive to harm Tri core or used improper means. Tricore Br. 31-33. Had the trial court addressed
whether Brinkmeyer's interference was improper, it should have applied the factors the Court
adopted from Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 767. See BECO, 145 Idaho at 723-24, 184 P.3d at
848-49; Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 338-39, 986 P.2d at 1004-05. The trial court cited
those factors but did not apply them. See R. 2014-1 7.
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The trial court erred in conflating intent of the intentional interference requirement with
whether Brinkmeyer' s alleged interference was improper and in failing to address the latter
question. See R. 2014-16. It simply concluded that Brinkmeyer had so-called "requisite improper
intent" by simply inferring intent. Id. Because the trial court used the wrong legal analysis, its
conclusion that Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the Tricore PSA cannot be sustained.

b.

The trial court failed to consider Brinkmeyer's good-faith
belief in the validity of Stockton's right of first refusal.

The trial court also failed to correctly apply the law of tortious interference in other ways.
Brinkmeyer explained in his opening brief (at pp. 33-35) that interference with a contract is not
intentional and improper when one advances a valid legal interest in good faith. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts§§ 773, 767. By leaning heavily on its conclusion that Stockton's right of first
refusal was unenforceable as a matter of law, the trial court side-stepped that principle. R. 201517. Finding it "ludicrous" that anyone would believe that Stockton owned a legitimate right to
the Warren Estate's Priest Lake property, the trial court ignored Stockton's valid legal interest,
Brinkmeyer' s understanding of that right, and his good-faith reliance on it. See id.
Tricore does not address this error either. Tricore Br. 29-33. It only argues that the
substantial evidence established that Stockton and Brinkmeyer intended to cause the Warren
Estate's breach of the Tricore PSA, acted with improper purpose, and used improper means, and
that their interference was not justified. But relying on substantial evidence cannot cure the trial
court's legal error in holding Brinkmeyer to different standards than required by Idaho law. The
trial court was bound to correctly state and apply the applicable law and make legal conclusions
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sustained by the facts found. See Pocatello Hosp., 156 Idaho at 714, 330 P.3d at 1072. The trial
court did not none of that.
The authority Brinkmeyer cites in his opening brief demonstrates that the trial court
should have considered whether Brinkmeyer' s conduct was intentional and wrongful based on
Stockton's right of first refusal and Brinkmeyer's good-faith belief that Stockton's contractual
right was valid and enforceable. See Syringa Networks, 155 Idaho at 65, 305 P.3d at 509 ("The
mere pursuit of one's own business purposes is not sufficient to support an inference of an
improper motive to harm the plaintiff."); Downey Chiropractic Clinic v. Nampa Rest. Corp., 127
Idaho 283, 286, 900 P.2d 191, 194 (1995) (finding a workers' compensation surety's insistence
that a worker receive treatment from a designated medical provider did not support an inference
that the surety's "sole motivation" was to harm the plaintiff).
Indeed, advancing a legal interest in good faith carries substantial weight in determining
whether the interference is tortious. See Oakley, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (C.D.
Cal. 2013) (applying California law). For example, in Oakley, Nike offered an endorsement
contract to a professional golfer when his contract with Oakley expired, although Oakley had a
right of first refusal. Id. at 1132-33. The golfer's attorney told Nike that Oakley would not
exercise its right, and the golfer entered into an endorsement contract with Nike covenanting that
he was free to do so. Id. at 1133-34. The court found that Nike did not commit intentional acts
designed to induce breach of the contract between Oakley and the golfer. Id. at 1135-38.
It follows that a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right can justify interference, even
when the claim ultimately proves to be mistaken. See also Ins. Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 116
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Idaho 948, 952 n.2, 782 P.2d 1230, 1234 n.2 (1989) (finding that while advice of counsel by
itself is not a defense to a tortious interference claim, it is a factor to be considered in
determining whether the interference was intentional). The trial court should have considered if
Brinkmeyer' s motive stemmed from a legitimate purpose derived from the law and if his conduct
was a consequence of actions taken for a purpose other than to interfere with a contract. Because
the trial court did not, it erred.

C.

Substantial and competent evidence does not support that Brinkmeyer
intentionally and improperly interfered with the Tricore PSA, causing its
breach, and did so without justification.

Setting aside the trial court's legal error in failing to consider Stockton's right of first
refusal, or Brinkmeyer's good-faith belief in its validity, Tricore produced no substantial and
competent evidence that Brinkmeyer's alleged interference was intentional, improper, caused the
Warren Estate to breach the Tri core PSA, and was unjustified. Substantial and competent
evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable trier of fact would accept to support a conclusion.
Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002).

Such evidence does not support the trial court's findings that Stockton and Brinkmeyer
"did actually lure" the Warren Estate to breach the Tricore PSA, R. 2015, and "succeeded in
inducing the Estate to breach" the contract, R. 2015-16. In his opening brief (at pp. 35-38),
Brinkmeyer detailed the Warren Estate's belief that Tri core had repudiated the Tri core PSA - a
belief shared by Chris and Dan Warren - and Finney's continuing efforts to "fish" for a buyer of
the Priest Lake property. R. 2000; Tr. 821:18-823:13, 829:22-834:15, 841:1-842:3, 872:5873:23, 877:4-878:8, 882:22-883:7, 1548:4-18, 1552:1-1553:19, 1577:3-1578:5 (Finney);
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Tr. 85:20-86:3 (Dan); Tr. 473:14-18, 491:19-492:19 (Chris).
Brinkmeyer also detailed the Warren Estate's deliberate negotiations with Stockton and
Brinkmeyer, its acknowledgment that Stockton held a valid and enforceable right of first refusal,
its offer to sell the Priest Lake property to Stockton and Brinkmeyer based on that preemptive
right, and its knowing and independent decision to enter into the Stockton PSA. Tr. 744:3-24,
745:21-746:1, 854:3-22, 864:4-19 (Finney); Tr. 668:2-5, 675:21-679:3, 681:1-24, 682:20-24,
683:18-684:8, 686:25-687:6, 692:8-12 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 578:25-579:8, 601:1-16 (Stockton); Ex.
8 (COE 106).
Faced with that undisputed evidence, Tricore's response is telling - it does not address or
challenge its veracity. See Tricore Br. 29-33. Instead Tricore lists what it believes is substantial
and competent evidence establishing that Stockton and Brinkmeyer acted with improper purpose
and used improper means to accomplish the interference. Ironically, Tricore's "evidence"
demonstrates the complete lack of substantial, competent, and relevant evidence supporting the
trial court's conclusion that Brinkmeyer's interference was intentional and wrongful and caused
the Warren Estate to breach of the Tricore PSA.
Take improper purpose. According to Tricore, improper purpose is supported by the fact
that Brinkmeyer and Stockton both "elected not to purchase the Estate property despite it being
directly offered to each in 2014 and 2015, and openly marketed in 2015 and 2015." Tricore Br.
32. Also: Brinkmeyer's "actions were done intentionally and with the knowledge it would harm
Tricore." Id. Tricore does not explain with argument or authority why that evidence is wrongful.
In any event, knowledge of the Tricore PSA is not the same as improper purpose. See
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Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 766 cmt. n. And Brinkmeyer has already established that the
Warren Estate never offered "the property" to Stockton or him before September 2, 2016 and
that being given the option to purchase does not satisfy a right of first refusal.
Tricore's "evidence" of improper means is equally insubstantial and incompetent. For
improper means, Tricore claims that Brinkmeyer did not disclose his decision to purchase the
property at a meeting with Clifford Mort (Mort), Tricore's owner; that Brinkmeyer "directed" the
Warren Estate to repudiate the Tri core PSA; that "Tricore was improperly led to believe that they
were proceeding with the sale to Tricore and a meeting would occur"; that "Brinkmeyer did not
disclose to Tricore that the property had been sold"; that Brinkmeyer violated "industry and trade
standards" by hiding his purchase from the listing agent; that Brinkmeyer required the Warren
Estate to close the sale prior to the Tricore PSA's closing date; and that Brinkmeyer "invented
legal justifications unsupported by the actual facts, pleadings or documents." Tricore Br. 33.
That "evidence" is either not supported by the record or does not support improper
means. "Improper means may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a
recognized rule of common law, or an established standard of a trade or profession. Some
additional examples of improper means ... include violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit
or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood."

Downey Chiropractic, 127 Idaho at 287, 900 P.2d at 194. As before, Tricore provides no
argument or authority to support the wrongfulness of the alleged conduct.
Tricore, for example, has not shown that Brinkmeyer owed or violated any duty to Mort
at their August 2016 meeting. In fact, Mort acknowledged at trial that Brinkmeyer had none.
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Tr. 310:3-311:12, 329:17-330:9 (Mort). Nor has Tricore shown that Brinkmeyer owed any duty
to inform it about the status of the Warren Estate's negotiations or owed any duty to the listing
agent pursuant to unnamed "industry and trade standards." And as shown above (supra, at pp. 68), there is no support for the claims that Brinkmeyer directed or maintained any control over the
Warren Estate's conduct, including its "legal justifications" in this case.
Simply put, none of the evidence cited by the trial court or Tri core supports the
conclusion that Brinkmeyer' s conduct was intentional or improper and caused the Warren Estate
to breach the Tricore PSA. There was no evidence that Stockton or Brinkmeyer made any
misrepresentations to the Warren Estate, applied unfair economic pressure, or threatened
litigation. Cf Tr. 857:3-15 (Finney); Tr. 473:11-13 (Chris); Tr. 102:16-24 (Dan). Indeed, Finney
and the Warren Estate made the conscious and independent decision to negotiate with Tricore,
on one hand, and with Stockton and Brinkmeyer, on the other- "to keep negotiations alive with
two potential fish." Tr. 1572:3-5, 745:11-20 (Finney). And once Stockton and Brinkmeyer
agreed to purchase the property, the Warren Estate "finally had a fish on the line," and it
"obliged." Tr. 865:6-7 (Finney).

D.

If the Tricore PSA is unenforceable, tortious interference with a business
expectancy claim is not an alternative basis to affirm the trial court.

In the event the Tricore PSA is found unenforceable, Tricore argues that the evidence
also supports tortious interference with a business expectancy, and thus no enforceable contract
is necessary for it to prevail. Tricore Br. 29-30. The trial court did not address the claim, and it
would be improper for the Court to do so now. See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho
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217, 225-26, 646 P.2d 988, 996-97 (1982). In Pope, the Court explained that the failure of the
trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on material issues necessitates reversal
and remand, unless the record yields no obvious answer to the relevant question. Id. But where
there is no evidence to support such findings, the judgment will simply be reversed. Id.
Even so, Tricore's tortious interference with a business expectancy claim fails for the
same reasons the trial court erred in finding Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with the Tricore
PSA. The two torts are similar and "cases and commentary addressing the two torts often apply
interchangeably the standards for proving the common elements." Highland Enters., 133 Idaho
at 338 n.3, 986 P.2d at 1004 n.3. As a result, the same deficiencies inherent in Tricore's claim for
tortious interference with a contract preclude recovery for tortious interference with a business
expectancy.
Lastly, aside from the "contract itself," Tricore does not explain what business
expectancy it may have in the absence of the Tricore PSA. In fact it has none. The purchase of
the property is not a valid business expectancy because it is contingent on Tricore obtaining a
valid and enforceable contract for its purchase. See Deck House, Inc. v. Link, 249 S.W.3d 817,
827 (Ark. 2007) (finding that interference with a business expectancy is not actionable when the
expectancy is subject to contingency); Belk v. Teague, No. CA07-1336, 2008 WL 2308911, at *3
(Ark. Ct. App. June 4, 2008) (unpublished) (explaining that when a party has an unenforceable
contract to purchase property, it cannot merely plead the existence of an expectancy because the
business expectancy is subject to a contingency, i.e., entering into a valid contract).
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II.

The trial court erred in finding that Brinkmeyer conspired with the Warren Estate
to breach the Tricore PSA.
For parties to have engaged in a civil conspiracy, they must have committed an

actionable civil wrong and reached an agreement to do something unlawful or some lawful thing
in an unlawful manner. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003). The
conspirators must have done some act that "amounts to an actionable tort," because that is the
gist of the action. Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386, 233 P. 883, 885 (1925). The trial
court erred in finding that Stockton and he conspired with the Warren Estate to breach the
Tricore PSA. Brinkmeyer Br. 38-41. Brinkmeyer is not liable for an underlying actionable wrong
(i.e., tortious interference) and cannot conspire with the Warren Estate to breach its own contract.
Tricore does not challenge the notion that Brinkmeyer cannot be liable for conspiracy if
he is not liable for tortious interference. Instead it argues that Stockton and Brinkmeyer
conspired to breach the Tricore PSA with the Warren Estate using "improper means and
improper purpose" - namely by the Warren Estate's alleged deceit in indicating it would meet
with Tricore and by Stockton and Brinkmeyer allegedly hiding the Stockton PSA. Tricore Br.
34-35. That is the same "evidence" Tricore cites to support the trial court's ruling on tortious
interference. As before, if that was the trial court's reasoning, the Court must reverse for lack of
substantial evidence. Tricore offers no authority or argument to support the unlawfulness of that
conduct or even that it was improper.
Tricore also argues that Brinkmeyer should be precluded from arguing that he cannot
engage in a conspiracy with the Warren Estate to breach the Tricore PSA. Tricore Br. 34 ("For
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the first time on appeal, Appellants argue California law to claim there can be no liability for
civil liability for any party if one conspirator is a party to the contract."). But "so long as a
substantive issue is properly preserved, a party's appellate argument may evolve on appeal."

Hoskins, 165 Idaho at 224, 443 P.3d at 238 (explaining that this allows parties to present new
authority on appeal to support substantive arguments that they made below); see also Idaho App.
R. 34(e) (allowing citation of additional authority).
Whether Stockton and Brinkmeyer engaged in a civil conspiracy by committing an
actionable wrong in agreement with the Warren Estate was raised and ruled on by the trial court.

See R. 2019-20, 2311, 2314. To be sure, the trial court ruled against Stockton and Brinkmeyer
but had trouble pinpointing exactly what unlawful objective they agreed to commit with the
Warren Estate. Initially, the trial court found the objective of the conspiracy was the tortious
interference with the Tricore PSA. R. 2020. But later the court back-tracked and concluded the
objective was the breach of the contract. R. 2310-11, 2314.
Brinkmeyer' s position has not changed on that issue: Stockton and he did not engage in
an actionable wrong to accomplish an unlawful objective in agreement with the Warren Estate.
R. 1870-71. The issue, having been considered by the trial court and an adverse ruling made, has
been preserved. See Hoskins, 165 Idaho at 222, 443 P.3d at 236 (to preserve an issue for appeal,
the issue and the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial court); Johnson v.

Crossett, 163 Idaho 200,207,408 P.3d 1272, 1279 (2018) (to preserve an issue for appeal there
must be a ruling by the court). Thus the Court can consider Brinkmeyer's reliance on Applied

Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454,459 (Cal. 1994), and the additional
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authorities he cites in his opening brief. See Brinkmeyer Br. 40-41.
That authority holds that "[b ]ecause a party to a contract owes no tort duty to refrain from
interference with its performance, he or she cannot be bootstrapped into tort liability by the
pejorative plea of conspiracy." Applied Equip., 869 P.2d at 459; see also Ariate Compania

Naviera, S.A. v. Commonwealth Tankship Owners, Ltd., 310 F. Supp. 416,421 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
("[O]ne contracting party does not have a cause of action against the other for conspiring to
breach the contract or for inducing the breach."). And if a party to the contract cannot be held
liable as a conspirator to breach their own contract, it "obviously is fatal to any similar claim
against the [defendant's] alleged coconspirator." Callahan v. Gutowski, 488 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521
(App. Div. 1985).
Tricore attempts to distinguish that authority by pointing out that California and New
York do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract, whereas Idaho does under certain
limited circumstances. But Tricore does not explain why that distinction matters. Tricore Br. 36.
Tricore also overstates its importance. In Applied Equipment, the California Supreme Court
rejected the approach advocated by the trial court here for two reasons: (1) it illogically expands
civil conspiracy to allow tort recovery against a party who owes no tort duty and (2) it destroys
"established distinctions between contract and tort theories of liability by effectively allowing the
recovery of tort damages for an ordinary breach of contract." 869 P.2d at 457.
Despite taking a different approach to punitive damages, Idaho courts share all of the
principles that underly Applied Equipment's reasoning. What Tri core fails to recognize, and what
the trial court ignored, is that a conspiracy cannot be alleged separate from the underlying wrong
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it was organized to achieve. Dahlquist, 40 Idaho at 386-91, 233 P. at 885-87; see also Saint

Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 123 n.4, 334 P.3d 780,
797 n.4 (2014) (observing that damages cannot be awarded for the conspiracy; they can only be
awarded for the actionable wrong they conspired to commit). As Dahlquist explained, conspiracy
"is only material for the purpose of showing the joinder of defendants." 40 Idaho at 390, 233 P.
at 887. It neither adds nor subtracts from Tri core's claims. It simply makes "all of the defendants
liable for each individual act of each of the other defendants." Id.
If it is the act done, and not the conspiracy to do the act, that is regarded as the essence of
an action for conspiracy, McPheters, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d at 321, coconspirators cannot be
liable for wrongs they did not and cannot legally commit, see Dahlquist, 40 Idaho 390, 233 P. at
887. In this case, there is no fundamental difference between the trial court's ruling that Stockton
and Brinkmeyer conspired with the Warren Estate to breach the Tricore PSA and the court's
earlier ruling that they conspired to interfere with the contract. Stockton and Brinkmeyer are
legally incapable of breaching a contract that they are not party to. And the Warren Estate is
legally incapable of interfering with the contract it is party to. See Ostrander v. Farm Bureau

Mut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993).
In other words, conspiracy allows recovery only against a party who already owes the
duty. And here Stockton and Brinkmeyer cannot be bootstrapped into contract liability any more
than the Warren Estate can be bootstrapped into tort liability. The trial court's invocation of
conspiracy alters the fundamental allocation of duty under Idaho law and muddies the distinction
between tort and contract remedies. In the end, the trial court's ruling cannot be reconciled with
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the law of conspiracy and the different duties - tort versus contract - owed by Stockton and
Brinkmeyer, on one hand, and the Warren Estate, on the other. No matter how one looks at it,
there was no civil conspiracy between Stockton and Brinkmeyer and the Warren Estate because
there was no there was no agreement to commit the same civil wrong.

III.

The trial court erred in finding Stockton and Brinkmeyer jointly and severally
liable for Tricore's attorney fees based on civil conspiracy.
A.

Civil conspiracy and joint and several liability cannot justify an award of
attorney fees and costs.

Brinkmeyer's opening brief (at pp. 41-43) explains why the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding Tricore attorney fees and costs against him: there is no contract or
commercial transaction between he and Tricore and no statute allows an award of attorney fees
for conspiracy or joint and several liability. Further, because liability for conspiracy is limited to
the underlying actionable wrong, Brinkmeyer' s liability is limited to the finding that he tortiously
interfered with the Tricore PSA. It is well settled that tortious interference is an action in tort, not
an action to recover on a contract or a commercial transaction, and is not a basis for attorney fees
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). See Bybee, 145 Idaho at 260-61, 178 P.3d at 625-26; Northwest

Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 842, 41 P.3d 263,270 (2002).
Despite that Brinkmeyer's liability is limited to tortious interference, Tricore argues that
his conspiracy with the Warren Estate to breach the Tricore PSA means that a commercial
transaction was the gravamen of the lawsuit under Section 12-120(3). Tricore Br. 38-39. Tricore
attempts to distinguish Bybee and Northwest Bee-Corp. on the basis that those claims were based
on a "statutory scheme," but that argument ignores that, as here, no commercial transaction
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occurred between the prevailing party and the party from whom fees are sought. See Bybee, 145
Idaho at 260, 178 P.3d at 625; Northwest Bee-Corp., 136 Idaho at 842, 41 P.3d at 270.
The same is true of Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 293
P.3d 645 (2013), and Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007),
on which Tricore also relies. In both decisions, a commercial transaction occurred between the
parties, was integral to the claim, and constituted the basis on which recovery was sought. See

Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 27, 293 P.3d at 651 (finding a commercial transaction occurred between
an attorney and client); Blimka, 143 Idaho at 728, 152 P.3d at 600 (finding a commercial
transaction occurred between a purchaser of jeans and a wholesaler). That is not the case here.
Brinkmeyer had no commercial dealings with Tricore, and no commercial transaction
was the basis for Tri core's claims against him. The Court should find as a matter of law that
there was no commercial transaction for the purposes of Section 12-120(3). The Court should
also find that the trial court abused its discretion because there is no other valid basis for the
award of attorney fees against Brinkmeyer. Idaho law does not support an award of attorney fees
against a conspirator whose underlying wrong was tortious interference with contract.

B.

Tricore is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal against
Brinkmeyer.

If Tri core prevails in this appeal, it is not entitled to an award of attorney fees or costs
against Brinkmeyer. As just explained, no statute allows such an award for tortious interference
or conspiracy, including Section 12-120(3). In addition, Idaho Code§ 12-121 does not apply.
That statute allows an award of attorney fees if the Court finds an appeal was brought or pursued
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frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Clark v. Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley,

P.A., 163 Idaho 215, 229-30, 409 P.3d 795, 809-10 (2017). No such circumstances exist here.
Brinkmeyer has raised serious and legitimate legal issues; he does not simply ask the Court to
second-guess the trial court's findings of facts, as Tricore contends. "[F]ees will generally not be
awarded when good faith arguments are made on appeal." Id. at 230, 409 P.3d at 810.

IV.

The trial court abused its discretion in adding $362,069.61 to the supersedeas bond
to compensate Tricore for the lost opportunity to develop the property.
Brinkmeyer's final issue on appeal is the trial court's order that Defendants post a bond

in an additional amount of $362,069.61 "[t]o compensate Tricore for the lost opportunity to
develop the property while the matter is being appealed." R. 2435; see Brinkmeyer Br. 43-44.
The trial court abused its discretion by setting a bond amount inconsistent with Idaho App. R.
13(b) and without reason. Compensation for the "lost opportunity to the develop the property"
does not protect the status quo (i.e., the use, preservation, or possession of the property), was
unjustified, and was an unreasonable windfall. See Idaho App. R. 13(b)(8), (10), and (14).
In response, citing Moore v. Townsend, 577 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978), Tricore argues that
a bond to stay a judgment ordering the transfer of real property must provide compensation for
the "natural and proximate result of the stay." Tricore Br. 39. It also cites to Great American

Indemnity Co. v. Bisbee, 59 Idaho 18, 79 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1938), for the proposition that a bond
may secure payment of the value of the use and occupation of the property during the appeal.
Neither case addresses the trial court's discretion under Idaho App. R. 13(b). See Moore, 577
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F.2d at 426 (addressing bonds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62); Great Am., 59 Idaho at_, 79 P.2d at
1038 (addressing bonds under former Idaho Code Ann. § 11-207, repealed).
Even so, both decisions necessarily require the party seeking damages from the delay to
prove what those damages are with reasonable certainty. See also Saint Alphonsus, 157 Idaho at
116, 334 P.3d at 790 (addressing evidence sufficient to prove damages). And here Tricore did
not. Its contention that it would lose nearly $8.5 million from the loss of use of the property
during the appeal, R. 2340, was wholly unsupported and entirely speculative. Certainty the trial
court did not accept it in setting the additional bond amount. See R. 2435-36. Nor did the trial
court accept Tri core's loss of use damages claim at trial. See R. 2023.
Still Tricore argues that it is being deprived of property worth $6,425,000, despite having
agreed to purchase it for $2.4 million. That assumes that the property is developable and that
Tricore proved the property's worth at trial, which it did not. See R. 2021-22. Tricore also alleges
that it has lost the use of the $2.4 million purchase price, along with over $4.6 million in funds
necessary for development and construction. Tricore does not explain how not spending those
monies has damaged it during the appeal. Retaining those monies, plus being compensated for
their apparent "loss of use," would amount to an unjustified and unreasonable windfall that is not
authorized by Idaho App. R. 13(b).
So too is the trial court's calculation of $362,069.61 to compensate Tricore for the "lost
opportunity to develop the property." The trial court fashioned that remedy using 18 months of
interest at the post-judgment interest rate on the purchase price of $2.4 million Tricore has not
paid, plus 136%. R. 2435. Such an amount bears no relationship to lost opportunities, as real
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property does not accrue interest. Even under the standard of Moore, the sum of $362,069.61 is
not a natural and proximate result of the stay. In setting an additional supersedeas bond, the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to act consistent with the applicable standards and to reach
its decision by exercise of reason. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863,421 P.3d at 194.

CROSS-APPEAL RESPONSE RE DAMAGES
I.

The trial court correctly found that Tricore is not entitled to money damages.
A.

Tricore's failed to prove damages with reasonable certainty.

Tri core asserts that the trial court erred by failing to award it damages for loss of the
Priest Lake property for two years and for damages related to preparing the property for use.
Tricore Br. 41-44. As the party claiming damages, it has the burden to prove not only the right to
damages, but also the amount of damages. See Fish v. Fleishman, 87 Idaho 126, 130, 391 P.2d
344, 346 (1964). Damages must be proven with reasonable certainty. Griffith v. Clear Lakes

Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009). While reasonable certainty does not
require mathematical certainty, damage awards cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Id.
The trial court's refusal to award Tricore damages is supported by substantial and
competent evidence and, as such, cannot be set aside. See Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 53,
408 P.3d 45, 51 (2017). To be plain, the trial court was not impressed with Tricore's evidence of
damages. For example, Mort testified that construction and development costs increased by "35
to 45 percent" - a total of $2.5 million based on a proforma he prepared that presumed the
property could be developed, despite its wetlands. Tr. 205:25-207:9 (Mort). The trial court found
that figure was "pulled out of thin air," R. 2023, and indeed it was.
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The only support for the $2.5 million increase in costs was Mort's testimony and
proforma. See Tr. 205:25-207:5 (Mort). And he acknowledged his estimates were merely
"guesstimates." Tr. 297:2-17 (Mort). He explained the costs were based on (1) increased costs
for "entitlements" because Tricore lost the "element of surprise" in the permit process, (2) the
potential for a recession down the road, and (3) increased marketing expenses. Tr. 205:25-207:9
(Mort). He also admitted that he had no experience with the development of wetlands requiring a
Section 404 permit, rendering any cost estimates associated with wetland fill requirements
conjecture. Tr. 282:20-283:10. 296:15-19 (Mort).
On top of that, Defendants produced multiple experts establishing that it was pure
speculation to assume the property could be developed as Tricore hoped. Expert witnesses Tom
Dubendorfer, Martin Taylor, and Jason Scott all opined that it was speculative to assume that
Tricore could obtain the government approvals necessary to develop the property as outlined in
Mort's proforma. Tr. 1155:22-1156:1-7 (Duebendorfer); Tr. 1210:14-1211:10 (Taylor); Tr.
1386:8-1397:12 (Scott). Mort himself admitted that he did not know if the property is
permittable or ultimately developable as proposed in his proforma and that if the property was
not developable, any damages would be speculative. Tr. 291:24-292:15, 295:19-24, 332:9-334:7
(Mort). The trial court was correct to find Tricore's evidence uncertain and speculative.
Tricore also failed to prove the increase in the property's market value with reasonable
certainty and to reduce any value to a discemable damage figure for loss of use. Tricore' s
explanation actually demonstrates why. See Tricore Br. 43-44. Testimony regarding the value the
property ran the gamut. It ranged from $2.68 million to as much as $7 million and included many
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assessments in between: e.g., $3.5 million, $5.445 million, and $6.424 million. See id. The trial
court noted the "huge variation in value" due to the many unknowns surrounding the wetlands
and their possible development, and refused to make an award. R. 2021-23. That decision is also
supported by substantial and conflicting evidence.
Finally, Tricore contends the trial court erred in failing to award it $170,000 in reliance
damages. These damages too were speculative. Mort testified that Tricore had spent "somewhere
near" $170,000. Tr. 207:10-208:25 (Mort). Also recall that Tricore first agreed to purchase
Parcels B and in late 2015 and incurred costs at that time exploring the property's developmental
potential. That first deal lapsed, and Tricore provided no evidence supporting when it incurred
the funds it expended, whether in the first deal or after it entered into the Tricore PSA.

B.

Tricore's request for damages in addition to specific performance seeks an
impermissible double recovery.

Tricore improperly asks this court to award it damages in addition to specific
performance of the Tricore PSA. As the trial court seemed to understand, that would amount to
an improper double recovery. R. 2021-23. A plaintiff may not "obtain specific performance and,
in essence, erase the breach, yet also seek damages at law for breach of contract. Such damages
are inconsistent with the retrospective erasure of the breach." Douglas Theater Corp. v. Chi. Title
& Trust Co., 681 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also Campbell v. Parkway Surgery
Ctr., LLC, 158 Idaho 957, 969, 354 P.3d 1172, 1184 (2015) (declining to consider specific
performance because money damages had been awarded).
In sum, the trial court did not err in finding Tricore was not entitled to money damages.
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Substantial and competent evidence supports its failure to prove damages with reasonable
certainty. The trial court also correctly determined that an award of the claimed damages would
constitute double recovery because Tri core would retain the benefit from the value of the
property and the expenses incurred once the property is transferred. The Court should grant no
relief on Tricore's cross-appeal.

II.

The trial court did not err in failing to award damages against Brinkmeyer for
violating the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Tricore argues that the trial court erred in failing to award damages against Stockton and

Brinkmeyer under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, Idaho Code§ 48-608(1). Tricore Br. 8,
44-45. But the trial court found they did not violate the statute and dismissed the claim on
summary judgment, R. 1216-17, 1218, and Tricore has not challenged that ruling on appeal, see
Tricore Br. 7-8. Tricore does not explain how, or cite any legal authority supporting that,
Brinkmeyer can be liable under a statute he did not violate. Nor can the trial court's finding of
conspiracy render Brinkmeyer liable under the statute. The many reasons why have already been
explained above at pages 30-35. The Court cannot award damages against Brinkmeyer under the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons explained, the Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and
order the entry of judgment in favor of Brinkmeyer on Tri core's tortious interference with
contract and conspiracy claims based on Stockton's valid right of first refusal. Alternatively, if
the Court finds remand is more appropriate, it should order the trial court to properly apply the
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standards governing those claims. In any event, there is no basis to affirm the judgment against
Brinkmeyer, and the Court should reverse it.
DATED: August 18, 2020.
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